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THE POWER OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD TO GRANT
INCLUSIVE TOUR AUTHORITY TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL AIR
CARRIERS UNDER THE 1962 AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT
Recently an equally divided Supreme Court issued a per curiarn
opinion1 affirming a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision that the
Civil Aeronautics Board lacked power under the 1962 amendment to the
Federal Aviation Act2 to grant inclusive tour authority3 to supplemental
airlines. 4 The challenge of the Board's authority was prompted by two
Board orders issued on March 11, 1966. One order certified certain airlines "to engage in supplemental air transportation (including inclusive
tour authority) with respect to persons or property ... between any point
in any State of the United States or the District of Columbia, and any
other point in any State of the United States or the District of Columbia." 5 The other certified certain transatlantic air carriers "to engage in
supplemental air transportation (including inclusive tour authority) with
respect to persons and their baggage . . . between points in Greenland,
Iceland, the Azores, Europe, Africa, and Asia as far east as (and including) India . . 6
The scheduled domestic carriers led by American Airlines immediately sought review7 of the first order in the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia. The order was upheld. The United States transatlantic carriers led by Pan American World Airlines subsequently
sought review8 of the second order in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. World Airways, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 88 S. Ct. 1715 (1968),
aff'g by an equally divided court Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770

(2d Cir. 1967).
2. Pub. L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962).
3. Inclusive tour charters allow tour operators to sell package tours (with
lodging and recreation expenses included in the package price) to individual members of
the public, after the tour operator has purchased the entire capacity of an aircraft.
4. Supplemental airlines, hereafter referred to as "supplementals," are those
airlines which by law can engage only in charter service (the purchase of the entire
capacity of an aircraft to transport passengers or luggage), as distinguished from the
scheduled carriers who can engage in both charter service and individually ticketed
service.
5.

Supplemental

Air Service

Proceeding,

Docket

13795,

C.A.B.

Order

No.

E23350 (March 11, 1966).
6. Reopened Transatlantic Charter Investigation, All Expense Tour Phase, C.A.B.
Order No. E24240 (March 11, 1966).

7. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
8. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967). The
transatlantic carriers were unable to seek review immediately since Board orders
pertaining to foreign air transportation do not become final, and hence reviewable, until
approved by the President. Such approval was not forthcoming until September 27, 1966.
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The ultimate favorable ruling by the Supreme Court in the latter case
overrules the holding of the American Airlines case.
In the American Airlines case, numerous arguments were offered in
the Board opinion and before the court supporting the Board's power to
authorize supplemental carriers to offer inclusive tour service. The Board
contended that although it has never granted inclusive tour authority in
the past, the statute on its face does not deny it power to make such
grants. In fact, the Board asserted, its previous abstention from granting
inclusive tour authority was grounded on policy rather than legal considerations.9
Section 401(d) (3) of the amendment states that "[i]n the case of
an application for a certificate to engage in supplemental air transportation,
the Board may issue a certificate. . ."" Supplemental air transportation
is defined in Section 401 (33) as ". . . charter trips in air transportation,
".

other than the transportation of mail by aircraft, rendered pursuant to
Section 401 (d) (3) of this Act to supplement the scheduled service authorized by certificates of public convenience and necessity issued pursuant
to Sections 401 (d) (1) and (2) of this Act."' 1 The key phrase, "charter
trip," was not defined in the Act, nor has it received much judicial gloss.
In the "split charter" case, 2 the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia approved an order of the Board declaring that the lease of onehalf the capacity of an airplane to two separate groups, the Elks and the
Masons, fell within the meaning of "charter," and affirmed the power of
the Board to define charter trip. In the court's estimation ".

.

. Congress

intended, although not without limits, that the Board should be free to
evolve a definition in relation to such variable factors as changing needs
and changing aircraft.... . 3 The court averred that the only limit on the
Board's power to define "charter trips" is that the definition which is
promulgated must not contravene Congressional intent to preserve the
distinction between group and individually ticketed travel.
The Board further argued in American Airlines that inasmuch as
the court's upholding of the split charter authority was without precedent,
a fortiori, inclusive tour authority should be upheld since it can be shown
to rest upon the decision in the Tauck Tours case.' 4 The latter decision
sanctioned the Interstate Commerce Commission's issuance of a broker's
9. Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, Docket 13795, C.A.B. Order No. E23350
(March 11, 1966) at 7. The Board did not delineate the policy considerations involved.
10. Pub. L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962) (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (3)

(1964)).
11. Pub. L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962), (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (33) (1964).
12. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
13. Id. at 354.
14. Tauck Tours, Inc. Extension-New York, N.Y., 49 M.C.C. 491 (1949).
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license to a travel agent authorizing him to charter buses from motor
carriers licensed to engage only in charter service. The analogy to surface transportation is helpful but not controlling; a different agency and
statute are involved, and unlike the Motor Carrier Act,' 5 the Federal
Aviation Act possesses a legislative history which might be viewed as
manifesting Congressional intent to prohibit all-expense (inclusive) tours.
The legislative history of the 1962 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act'6 reveals a lack of unified Congressional intent. The bill which
after undergoing amendment ultimately became law was prepared by the
Board and introduced into both houses of Congress. The bill finally
adopted by the Senate is notable for its definition of "charter service"
which clearly, albeit circuitously, ceded to the Board power to authorize
the supplementals to engage in all-expense-paid tours." In contrast, embodied in the final House version was a definition of "supplemental air
transportation" which utilized the term "charter trip" without elaboration.
The report of the House Committee in explication of the refusal to define
"charter" stated:
The supplementals recommended that a definition of charter be
written into the bill and this was given consideration by your
committee. The bill passed by the Senate has such a definition.
Your committee, however, after considering the problem, came
to the conclusion that under the circumstances, authority to define charter service should be left, as at present, with the Board,
subject to the limitations contained in the reported bill. This
is a very difficult subject and any effort to freeze a definition
of charter service into law could well lead to complications."
A Joint Conference Committee finally adopted a bill which adhered
to the House version and omitted the definition of "charter service."
In American Airlines the court opined that the adoption of the House
bill possibly evinces an intent not to freeze the definition of "charter" but
to leave the authority to define "charter" with the Board. Such reasoning
15. National Business Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 689, 696-97
(D.N.J. 1956).
16. Pub. L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962).
17. The grant of power appears in an exception to an exception in the Senate bill,
which defined "charter service" to mean "air transportation performed by an air carrier
holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity where the entire capacity of
one or more aircraft has been engaged for the movement of persons and their baggage
or for the movement of property on a time, mileage, or trip basis, but shall not include
transportation services offered by an air carrier to individual members of the general
public or performed by an air carrier under an arrangement with any person who
provides or offers to provide transportation services to individual members of the general
public, other than as a member of a group on an all-expense-paid tour."
18. H. R. REP. No. 1177, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961).
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is sound to the extent the Joint Conference Committee was aware of and
accepted the interpretation placed on the House bill by the House Committee. The probability of such awareness, however, is small since "during floor debate on the compromise bill, six of the seventeen member conference committee stated that the authority to engage in 'inclusive tours'
was not to be allowed under the proposed legislation."' 9
A theory propounded in the Board opinion to the effect that adoption
of the House version over the Senate version meant not that inclusive
tour authority was denied, but that the Senate retreated from its position
that the Board be required to grant inclusive tour authority to supplementals was correctly rejected by the court. The language of the Senate
version was clearly permissive rather than mandatory.20
A third argument advanced in both the court and the Board opinions
relied on statements by several senators and congressmen to the effect that
the primary fear of the legislators was that the supplementals might divert
traffic from the scheduled airlines by abuse of the inclusive tour authority
which permitted the sale by travel agents of individually ticketed service
on planes previously chartered by them. The court reasoned that because
inclusive tour authority had never been granted previously, the fear was
necessarily based on the supplementals' previous abuse of the ten-flightper-month rule.2 The court continued:
The key to this case, we believe, is the fact that Congress at the
time it passed the legislation had no way of knowing specifically
how the Board would regulate the actions of the supplementals
with respect to inclusive tour charters. .

.

. We believe an an-

alysis of the regulations will demonstrate even further that the
Board has effectively precluded the possibility that the fears
apprehended by the legislators will in fact be realized.22
The above facts support the conclusion proffered but not by the
reasoning process chosen by the court. The rationale should not be that
later regulations by the Board authorize the court to re-legislate what the
legislature would have enacted had it known what restrictions the Board
would eventually place on inclusive tours, but that the regulations add
19.

Sayre, Fedoral Aviation Act-Statutory Interpretation-Inchsive Tours, 33

J.Am L. & Coai. 179, 181 (1967).
20. See the definition of "charter service" in note 15 supra.
21. Designed to prevent the supplementals from competing with the scheduled
carriers, the ten-flight-per-month rule prohibited any supplemental carrier from offering
more than ten flights per month between the same two cities. The supplementals
ultimately set up pooling agreements under which they effectively offered a regular
schedule between several sets of cities, while at the same time each was complying with
the ten-flight-per-month rule. Sayre, supra note 19, at 180.
22. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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reasonableness to the definition of a term which Congress did not define
and which legislative history left ambiguous.
The regulations23 greatly limit the scope of the supplementals'
authority. A joint application from the tour operator and the supplemental
air carrier must be filed with the Board ninety days before the tour begins.
Copies of the application are to be filed with the scheduled air carriers who
serve the points involved in the tour, so that they can file answers if they
so desire. A tour prospectus must also be filed specifying the name and
address of the operator, the time of the flight, the equipment to be used,
the itinerary, the tour price per passenger, the charter price, the individually
ticketed fare, the number of persons participating in the tour, and samples
of advertising to be used. The tour operator is required to furnish a bond
of not less than twice the amount of the charter price. The length of the
tour must be at least seven days. The land portion of the tour must provide overnight hotel accommodations at a minimum of three places other
than the point of origin. The tour price must include, at a minimum, all
hotel accommodations. The charge per passenger must not be less than
110 per cent of any available fare charged by any route carrier for individually ticketed service over the same route. Within thirty days after
completion of the tour, the tour operator and the supplemental air carrier
must file a joint post tour report indicating, inter alia, any deviations from
the tour proposed in the application and the reasons for such deviations.
Certainly these regulations, if enforced, will prevent inclusive tours
from diverting daily commuter traffic, one way non-return point to point
traffic, round trip traffic when the time of return is not known well in
advance to coincide with the tour return time, and round trip traffic involving stays of less than seven days. Nonetheless, it will divert the traffic of
persons planning trips or vacations of seven days or more who might
otherwise purchase scheduled air transportation and provide their own
accommodations. This diversion, however, would probably be of minor
significance relative to the traffic not diverted. Furthermore, as the Board
has indicated with probable accuracy, inclusive tours might encourage air
travel on the part of some who have not flown previously. For example,
the lower price of inclusive tours might induce middle income families to
take vacations by air although they have not been able to afford air transportation on the scheduled carriers. The pre-planned itinerary would
also appeal to such families although travel agents for the scheduled carriers provide similar service.
That many travel agents would become tour operators and channel
substantial portions of their pleasure traffic to the tours in order to pro23.

C.A.B. Special Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 378 (1968).
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tect their investment was also contended by American Airlines. The
Board responded that due to "substantial commitments, as well as financial
risks, in connection with chartering aircraft, reserving hotel space, and
the like, as well as heavy marketing and promotional expenditures," 24
tour operations are likely to be undertaken primarily by the larger or
wholesale travel agents. The bulk of travel agents, who are too small to
take the financial risks of inclusive tours, can not withstand the economic
pressure of having to fill chartered aircraft. The contention is buttressed
by the fact that since the agent's commission is based on a percentage of
the tour fare, the travel agent will have a greater incentive to sell the
higher priced tour on a scheduled carrier. Nonetheless, this reply is inapt.
Surely, knowledge that only the largest travel agents will divert traffic to
the supplementals will be of no great comfort to the scheduled carriers.
In the Pan American case25 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
after denying application of the doctrine of res judicata by distinguishing
the case from American Airlines on the ground foreign air transportation
differed substantially from domestic air transportation, denied that the
Board had power to authorize supplementals to engage in transatlantic
inclusive tours. Noting the absence of specific statutory language and the
difficulties of interpreting the committee reports, the court based its opinion
entirely on the Congressional intent expressed in statements by the floor
managers in each house. The court observed that the floor managers
"were members of the legislative committee that held extensive hearings
and were responsible for formulating the legislation." 2
Typical of the floor managers' statements are those of Senator
Cotton and Representative Williams. Senator Cotton stated:
The conferees agreed to drop the language in the Senate bill
which defined charter service, and permitted the sale of tickets
on charter flights to individual members of the general public
who were on all-expense-paid tours. I am wholly in accord with
the action in eliminating the all-expense tour provision and thus
refusing to confer this power on the Board. 7
Representative Williams stated:
The Senate receded and accepted the position of the House on
The all-expense tours that were provided
that provision ....
24.
E23350
25.
26.
27.

Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, Docket No. 13795, C.A.B. Order No.
(March 11, 1966).
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 782.
108 CONG. RiEc. 12284 (1962).
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for in the Senate definition were not accepted by the House, and
the Senate receded and concurred in our position on that, also."
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

'With respect to the definition of "charter trip," it should be recognized
that the only document which in theory under our system of government
expresses the intent of Congress is the bill which Congress finally enacts.
Congress does not enact the legislative history. Congressional debate,
committee reports, and remarks in Congressional hearings relate the
intent of only a small number; the ultimate expression of intent is embodied in the act itself. Only where the statute is ambigous and there
is near unanimity in the legislative history should legislative history be a
relevant consideration in discerning Congressional intent.
The legislative history of the Act is ambiguous at best; some support
may be mustered for either interpretation. Under these circumstances the
term "charter trip" should be defined within the context of the Act and in
conformity with any purpose expressed in the Act itself with some weight
given to any portion of the legislative history which inexorably points in
a single direction and is not inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Act
itself. By focusing on the Act, one concludes that the fact that the 1962
amendment allowed the supplementals to engage only in charter service,
while the scheduled carriers relied mainly on non-charter (individually
ticketed) service indicates-or at least is consistent with-the view that
Congress intended that the supplementals were not to compete to any
substantial extent with scheduled carriers.
Further, the Board, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, and those who would point to
legislative history are in complete agreement that one of the main purposes
of the Act was to assure the viability of both carriers, supplementals and
scheduled, to the extent possible without allowing the supplementals to
compete effectively with the scheduled carriers.
With no definition of "charter trip" given in the Act, a board of
experts charged with administering the Act, a universally accepted overall purpose of preventing effective competition between the supplementals
and the scheduled carriers, and an ambiguous legislative history behind the
Act, the issue meriting attention would seem to be the reasonableness of
the definition offered by the Board in light of the universally accepted
purpose of the Act. That the Board's definition is reasonable is attested
to by the fact that it provides a reasonable possibility of increasing the
supplementals' viability without substantially injuring the scheduled car28.

108 CONG. REc. 12322 (1962).
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riers, all of whom at present are operating without government subsidy.
By increasing their civilian traffic-while diverting only a relatively small
amount of traffic from the scheduled carriers-the supplementals can better
afford more up-to-date planes and equipment, remain better equipped to
perform their statutorily imposed duty of meeting the needs of our national
defense, and accord with the defense department's new ruling that military
charters will only be awarded to supplementals who perform thirty per
cent of their operations for civilian traffic. 9 Further enhancing the reasonableness of the Board's definition are the fact that inclusive tour
authority has been granted only for a five year experimental period and is
subject to review at the end of that period, the power of the Board to
modify the regulations or revoke certificates at any time an abuse is discovered, and the possibility of broadening the base of potential air
travelers.
Even if it be granted that the Board may fail to enforce some of its
regulations, the risk of diversion is still not sufficiently great to warrant
abolishing inclusive tour authority. Enforcement of the mere basics of
the inclusive tour regulations, such as the 110 per cent price rule, the
seven day rule, and the minimum three stopover rule, would prevent
setting up schedules suitable for daily commuter service or any other service involving trips of less than seven days. In addition, as the 1962
amendment itself illustrates, Congress has shown its willingness to act
upon the Board's failure to regulate in accordance with Congressional
wishes. Significantly, the scheduled carriers are certain to function as
"watch dogs" for the Board and Congress and may be expected to make
known the most minuscule of violations or injuries to scheduled operations.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Supreme Court should have reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby declaring the 1962
Amendment to have constituted no bar to the action of the Board in
authorizing the supplemental carriers to engage in inclusive tours.3"
John L. Steinkamp
29. Sayre, supra note 19, at 183 n.30.
30. Subsequent to the preparation of this note Congress has amended "charter trip"
to include inclusive tours. Pub. L. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (1968). This amendment will
afford an opportunity to test the validity of the policy arguments offered herein.

